Olavus Petri
One of Luther’s first disciples was the Swedish reformer Olavus Petri (d. 1552). His disputation was held in Wittenberg in 1518, and from this we can tell that he was an eyewitness to Luther’s first appearances as a reformer. In his writings, which were epoch-making for Swedish literature, Petri set forth a clear and independent presentation of the Reformation point of view. His best-known books are Concerning God’s Word and Man’s Precepts and Regulations (1528) and A Small Book of Sermons (1530). In his basic ideas he followed Luther, but in the details and the form of his presentation he was independent of him. Petri had also learned from humanism. His pedagogical interest, his insistence upon clarity, and his Biblical argumentation reveal a kinship with the humanist school. This does not mean, however, that he accepted the content of humanist teachings. He accepted Luther’s position with respect to the omnipotence of God and the enslavement of man. To justify these beliefs he was content to refer to the Bible: reason must bow before the clear witness of God’s Word, even though the consequences of this are seemingly unreasonable in some cases. In a similar situation Luther was more likely to base his arguments on the entirety of the evangelical faith.
Olavus Petri liked to emphasize the unity between faith and works. The true faith must express itself in a new life. If regeneration is lacking, so is the true faith. In controversies with the Uppsala theologian Peder Galle and the Danish reform humanist Paul Helie, Petri developed his position with great clarity. For the most part, however, he sought to attain the goals he set for himself in the service of the Reformation without using polemics.
Johannes Brenz
This man, who is remembered above all as the reformer of Württemberg, was one of Luther’s earliest and most faithful supporters. He died in 1570. In the dispute over the Lord’s Supper in the 1520s Brenz participated in the defense of the Lutheran position. And when the Calvinist interpretation became more widespread later on, he had further occasion to defend and more fully develop the same point of view. He described the Real Presence as a physical presence (manducatio oralisandmanducatio infidelium). But it was most characteristic of his position on the Lord’s Supper to retain and develop Luther’s concept of the ubiquity of the body of Christ (which Melanchthon rejected). He used this concept to justify the teaching of the Real Presence. It is not only in heaven (he said) that Christ’s human nature shares in the omnipresence and omnipotence of the divine nature; it also did so while He lived on earth. And it is in the power of this ubiquity that Christ’s body canbe present in the sacramental elements.
With ideas of this kind, Brenz provided the classical form for the way of looking at things which even later and in other contexts gave a certain uniqueness to the theology of Swabia (Württemberg). This theological position is characterized by a Biblical realism which is independent of the rational world view, with a tendency toward mysticism and subtle speculation. Brenz’s firm defense of the fundamentals of the Reformation did much to preserve the distinctiveness of genuine Lutheranism. His theology also exerted a strong influence on the Swedish tradition.
Biblical Theology
An essential but frequently overlooked facet of Reformation theology was the highly developed activity in the field of Biblical theology which was then carried on. This activity provided the basis for the theological work of the Reformation era as well as of the following generations. Some of the better-known books in this field were Matthias Flacius’ Clavis Scripturae sacrae (1567), a comprehensive examination of Biblical fundamentals, and Syntagma seu corpus doctrinae Novi Testamenti(1558), by Wigand and Judex. The latter is a complete book of dogmatics, based on a simple Bible-theological method, whereby the authors sought to present a collation of the content of Scripture without resorting to the use of philosophical categories.
Melanchthon’s Disciples
A stronger attachment to philosophy, as well as to antiquity and Christian tradition, was characteristic of that group of prominent theologians who can be best described as the disciples of Melanchthon. This group included the above-named Victorinus Strigel and Christoph Pezel (who later went over to Calvinism), plus Nikolaus Selneccer.
A mediating position was adopted by Martin Chemnitz (d. 1586), who agreed with Melanchthon on many points but who at the same time was also one of the prime advocates of pure Lutheranism. He also employed a Biblical method. Chemnitz is well known as one of the authors of the Formula of Concord (see below). His writings (e.g., the posthumously published Loci theologici) formed the strongest connecting link between the Reformation period and Lutheran orthodoxy. In his book De duabus naturis in Christo (1570) Chemnitz presented a detailed, systematic description of the teaching of the communication of attributes. Another exemplary contribution from his pen is the examination of the decisions of the Council of Trent, Examen concilii tridentini (1565–73).
The Theological Controversies
a.General. The doctrinal disputes which agitated the Lutheran Church during the years following the Reformation have often been thought of as more or less fruitless word-battles. But a more careful evaluation will show that—in most cases, at any rate—these disputes concerned significant doctrinal questions, which necessarily came to the fore as men sought to give more precise form to the message of the Reformation. Some of these controversies involved questions which later proved to be of no importance, but on the whole the intra-Lutheran doctrinal disputes led to a deeper understanding of the Lutheran doctrine of justification and to a more precise delineation of its consequences.
The many different controversies can be more easily surveyed if one will bear in mind that a great number of them are directly related to one another and refer to central questions concerning salvation or the acquisition of salvation. The so-called first antinomian controversy concerned the preaching of repentance. The synergistic controversy had to do with the process involved in the conversion experience. The meaning of justification was debated in the Osiandrian controversy, while the Majoristic and the second antinomian controversies concerned the question of good works and the third use of the Law.
b. The controversy concerning Agricola’s antinomianism. Johann Agricola came to Wittenberg from Eisleben ca. 1537 and asserted that the Law ought not be preached among Christians, but only the Gospel. The comfort of the Gospel should be preached first, and only then might people be frightened by God’s wrath. In this connection Agricola made a highly unusual distinction between wrath and law. He referred to Rom. 2:4, where we are told that “God’s kindness is meant to lead you to repentance.” With this in mind, Agricola maintained that men should be aroused to contrition and repentance only through the Gospel—through the preaching of Christ’s suffering. Luther looked upon Agricola’s thesis as a grave misinterpretation of his doctrine and became involved in the struggle himself (in a number of disputations with the antinomians, as well as in the treatise Wider die Antinomer, 1539). Luther pointed out that the contrition and grief which is associated with repentance can only be awakened by the Law, which reveals sin. Hence the Law must be proclaimed. The Law is everything that reveals sin, wrath, and death. And to the extent that the Christian is always a sinner, he remains subject to the operation of the Law, which is designed to put the old man to death. Agricola’s antinomian views did not exert any great influence at the time, but similar ideas have been put into practice in Lutheran circles since that time—for example, in the group which had its center at Herrnhut.
c. The problem of synergism. The so-called synergistic controversy of the 1550s and 1560s traced its origins from the statements of certain “Philippists” to the effect that the will could be said to cooperate to some extent in the conversion experience. The major opponents were Flacius and Strigel, who gave this matter a thorough analysis at the Weimar Disputation of 1560. According to Strigel the will, in conversion, continues to function in its natural way. It is simply transformed from an evil will to a good will. But Flacius asserted that the natural will is entirely unable to assist in conversion. It does not merely remain passive; it actively resists grace. Because of this, a completely new will, a “new man,” must be created, while the old will is restrained and coerced by the grace of God. This debate—which led to no tangible result—was obscured by the fact that the opposing sides held stubbornly to the question of the cooperation of the will (synergism), while as a matter of fact another problem was also involved. For Strigel proceeded on the basis of a philosophically conceived theory of the will, while Flacius—although with strange expressions—supported the Biblical concept of the new creation (the new man). Strigel’s main point was that conversion, as a progressive experience, always takes place on the level of the human will. Flacius maintained, on the other hand, that the first stage of the conversion experience (or “the first conversion,” as he put it) is wholly the result of grace, and that the human will, which is naturally depraved, is so far removed from doing what is good that it rather resists the grace of God.
Flacius’ controversial teaching of original sin also became involved in this same debate. Strigel, who held that man does not receive a new will (in a substantial sense) in conversion, also asserted that the essence of man was not lost in the fall into sin. He was therefore able to describe original sin as an “accident.” But Flacius felt that this represented a modification of the sin concept, and so he opposed Strigel on this point as well. According to Flacius, original sin is a “substance,” or rather, something congruent with man’s substantial form (forma substantialis). Basically, Flacius desired to defend the Biblical and Lutheran totus homo view of man (by which original sin concerns the whole man, just as regeneration implies the appearance of a “new man”), but he transformed this trend of thought into an (even philosophically) unsatisfactory theory which was generally repudiated by theologians and cast the shadow of heresy over its author.
d. The rejection of Osiander’s doctrine of justification. Andreas Osiander (remembered as a leader of the Reformation in Nürnberg, later pastor in Königsberg) in a debate in 1550 set forth certain ideas concerning justification which were obviously foreign to the current interpretation. Osiander believed that our justification cannot be provided by the atoning work wrought by Christ many hundreds of years ago. It must rather be related to the Christ who dwells within us, i.e., to the divine nature which is imparted to us through the acceptance of the Gospel. What Osiander objected to, in other words, was the undiluted imputation concept. He taught that we become just not through an external imputation but by the fact that Christ dwells in us as an “inner Word.” The Atonement is only the necessary prerequisite for this experience, given once and for all time.
Osiander’s critics (above all, Melanchthon and Flacius) insisted that the concept of “justification,” as used in the Bible, means “to declare just.” Justification by faith is possible because of Christ’s superabundant fulfilling of the Law, imputed to us. This is an aliena justitia, located outside of us (extra nos). One must carefully distinguish between this and the first stages of regeneration, which come into being as a result of the indwelling Spirit and which are not the basis of justification.
The undiluted imputation idea and its related forensic concept of the Atonement made it hard to grasp the connection between justification and regeneration. But as a result of the Osiandrian controversy the original Reformation idea that it is the sinner who is justified and that justification by faith consists of the forgiveness of sin (and not of inherent qualities) was strongly affirmed. In his own way Osiander had intended to express some facets of Luther’s theology which had otherwise been ignored, but he confused Reformation concepts with speculations derived from the Cabala and mysticism (the inner Word). The current Lutheran interpretation of justification was more firmly established as a result of the dispute with Osiander. The tendency to distinguish between imputation and regeneration and to think of the Atonement solely in legalistic categories was strengthened.
e. The Majoristic controversy made no essential contribution to the theological discussion. Georg Major, one of Melanchthon’s followers, defended the proposition that “good works are necessary to salvation.” The Gnesio-Lutherans looked upon this as an example of works righteousness, and they replied (as they had in the Osiandrian controversy) by drawing a sharp line of demarcation between justification (which precedes all works) and regeneration. One of Major’s most zealous opponents, Nikolaus von Amsdorf, advocated the opposite thesis, that “good works are harmful to salvation.” It is obvious that both propositions were poorly formulated and left room for numerous misunderstandings. Major did not mean that good works are necessary for justification; he only meant to say that they must accompany faith—that faith would cease without them. Hence good works are necessary to preserve faith. Against this it was pointed out that justification is not preserved by works but only by faith, which is to say, by returning to grace.
Amsdorf intended to give expression to the Lutheran sola fide concept when he set forth his thesis. The way he did this, however, served to obscure the ineluctable connection between faith and works. The chief results of this controversy were that in the future many of the ambiguous formulations used in the debate were avoided and that conditions were provided for a clearer definition of the place of good works within the context of the doctrine of justification.
f. The second antinomian controversy was chiefly concerned with the question of the third use of the Law. Some of the so-called Gnesio-Lutherans—Amsdorf, Poach, and Otto—maintained that neither justification nor the new life is regulated by the Law, but that both are elevated above the legal order. The justified man does not therefore stand under the Law; he freely fulfills its commands. This is not antinomianism in the strict sense of the term, since these men did not question the preaching of the Law or deny the function of the Law in producing knowledge of sin. They simply desired to sharpen the contrast between the Gospel as a gift of grace and the Law as something to which men are obligated. Those who opposed them said that a denial of the third use of the Law involved a diminution of the Law’s status, and they therefore called it antinomianism. The problem was settled in such a way that the idea of a third use of the Law was commonly accepted. This implies that the concept of the Law is understood in the widest sense as a designation for God’s will in general, and not simply as an expression for an obligatory order. The point was also made that the regenerated are not only “righteous” but also “sinners,” and because of this require the guidance and nurture of the Law.
g. The dispute over adiaphora. In the interest of attaining unity between the different confessions, Melanchthon conceded that the Lutherans could reintroduce a number of discarded ceremonies. These were, as seen from the Lutheran point of view, “adiaphora”—things indifferent to faith and conscience. The Leipzig Interim of 1548, a confessional document accepted for a time by some Lutheran churches, elaborated this point of view. The stricter Lutherans, however, looked upon this as an act of treason against the evangelical faith. These reinstituted ceremonies were certainly adiaphora; but when enemies of the Gospel insisted on their use as a necessary thing, then their acceptance implied a denial of evangelical freedom. In a situation which involved one’s confession or the freedom of the Gospel, nothing could be thought of as an adiaphoron. Flacius said, “When confession and offense are involved, nothing is an adiaphoron” (In casu confessionis et scandali nihil est adiaphoron). The harsh words spoken by Paul to Peter in the situation recorded in Gal. 2 were used as a comparison. Melanchthon later recognized that he had been in error on this question.
h. The controversy over the Lords Supper. The Calvinistic concept of the Lord’s Supper was attacked in 1552 by the Lutheran theologian Joachim Westphal of Hamburg. This led to a thorough debate on the Sacrament between Lutherans and Calvinists. Among the Lutherans who took part was the above-mentioned Johannes Brenz, who upheld the conservative Lutheran position and set forth anew the concepts of ubiquity and of the communication of attributes as arguments in support of a literal and realistic interpretation of the words of institution.
Melanchthon and his disciples, who dominated the faculty in Wittenberg at this time, did not at the outset become involved in this dispute. After Melanchthon died, however, the Lord’s Supper became the most decisive point of controversy between the Philippists and the Gnesio-Lutherans. The Wittenberg theologians felt that the Real Presence ought not be explained with the help of the ubiquity doctrine. They were opposed in this by Martin Chemnitz and by Jakob Andreä of Württemberg. When an anonymous statement written by one of Melanchthon’s followers appeared in 1574 and set forth the Reformed implications of Melanchthon’s doctrine of the Lord’s Supper, the Elector took action against the Wittenberg theologians. The so-called Torgau Articles condemned the Calvinist point of view. The Philippists on the Wittenberg faculty were replaced in the 1570s by conservative Lutheran theologians, and so-called Crypto-Calvinism was suppressed.
One of Luther’s first disciples was the Swedish reformer Olavus Petri (d. 1552). His disputation was held in Wittenberg in 1518, and from this we can tell that he was an eyewitness to Luther’s first appearances as a reformer. In his writings, which were epoch-making for Swedish literature, Petri set forth a clear and independent presentation of the Reformation point of view. His best-known books are Concerning God’s Word and Man’s Precepts and Regulations (1528) and A Small Book of Sermons (1530). In his basic ideas he followed Luther, but in the details and the form of his presentation he was independent of him. Petri had also learned from humanism. His pedagogical interest, his insistence upon clarity, and his Biblical argumentation reveal a kinship with the humanist school. This does not mean, however, that he accepted the content of humanist teachings. He accepted Luther’s position with respect to the omnipotence of God and the enslavement of man. To justify these beliefs he was content to refer to the Bible: reason must bow before the clear witness of God’s Word, even though the consequences of this are seemingly unreasonable in some cases. In a similar situation Luther was more likely to base his arguments on the entirety of the evangelical faith.
Olavus Petri liked to emphasize the unity between faith and works. The true faith must express itself in a new life. If regeneration is lacking, so is the true faith. In controversies with the Uppsala theologian Peder Galle and the Danish reform humanist Paul Helie, Petri developed his position with great clarity. For the most part, however, he sought to attain the goals he set for himself in the service of the Reformation without using polemics.
Johannes Brenz
This man, who is remembered above all as the reformer of Württemberg, was one of Luther’s earliest and most faithful supporters. He died in 1570. In the dispute over the Lord’s Supper in the 1520s Brenz participated in the defense of the Lutheran position. And when the Calvinist interpretation became more widespread later on, he had further occasion to defend and more fully develop the same point of view. He described the Real Presence as a physical presence (manducatio oralisandmanducatio infidelium). But it was most characteristic of his position on the Lord’s Supper to retain and develop Luther’s concept of the ubiquity of the body of Christ (which Melanchthon rejected). He used this concept to justify the teaching of the Real Presence. It is not only in heaven (he said) that Christ’s human nature shares in the omnipresence and omnipotence of the divine nature; it also did so while He lived on earth. And it is in the power of this ubiquity that Christ’s body canbe present in the sacramental elements.
With ideas of this kind, Brenz provided the classical form for the way of looking at things which even later and in other contexts gave a certain uniqueness to the theology of Swabia (Württemberg). This theological position is characterized by a Biblical realism which is independent of the rational world view, with a tendency toward mysticism and subtle speculation. Brenz’s firm defense of the fundamentals of the Reformation did much to preserve the distinctiveness of genuine Lutheranism. His theology also exerted a strong influence on the Swedish tradition.
Biblical Theology
An essential but frequently overlooked facet of Reformation theology was the highly developed activity in the field of Biblical theology which was then carried on. This activity provided the basis for the theological work of the Reformation era as well as of the following generations. Some of the better-known books in this field were Matthias Flacius’ Clavis Scripturae sacrae (1567), a comprehensive examination of Biblical fundamentals, and Syntagma seu corpus doctrinae Novi Testamenti(1558), by Wigand and Judex. The latter is a complete book of dogmatics, based on a simple Bible-theological method, whereby the authors sought to present a collation of the content of Scripture without resorting to the use of philosophical categories.
Melanchthon’s Disciples
A stronger attachment to philosophy, as well as to antiquity and Christian tradition, was characteristic of that group of prominent theologians who can be best described as the disciples of Melanchthon. This group included the above-named Victorinus Strigel and Christoph Pezel (who later went over to Calvinism), plus Nikolaus Selneccer.
A mediating position was adopted by Martin Chemnitz (d. 1586), who agreed with Melanchthon on many points but who at the same time was also one of the prime advocates of pure Lutheranism. He also employed a Biblical method. Chemnitz is well known as one of the authors of the Formula of Concord (see below). His writings (e.g., the posthumously published Loci theologici) formed the strongest connecting link between the Reformation period and Lutheran orthodoxy. In his book De duabus naturis in Christo (1570) Chemnitz presented a detailed, systematic description of the teaching of the communication of attributes. Another exemplary contribution from his pen is the examination of the decisions of the Council of Trent, Examen concilii tridentini (1565–73).
The Theological Controversies
a.General. The doctrinal disputes which agitated the Lutheran Church during the years following the Reformation have often been thought of as more or less fruitless word-battles. But a more careful evaluation will show that—in most cases, at any rate—these disputes concerned significant doctrinal questions, which necessarily came to the fore as men sought to give more precise form to the message of the Reformation. Some of these controversies involved questions which later proved to be of no importance, but on the whole the intra-Lutheran doctrinal disputes led to a deeper understanding of the Lutheran doctrine of justification and to a more precise delineation of its consequences.
The many different controversies can be more easily surveyed if one will bear in mind that a great number of them are directly related to one another and refer to central questions concerning salvation or the acquisition of salvation. The so-called first antinomian controversy concerned the preaching of repentance. The synergistic controversy had to do with the process involved in the conversion experience. The meaning of justification was debated in the Osiandrian controversy, while the Majoristic and the second antinomian controversies concerned the question of good works and the third use of the Law.
b. The controversy concerning Agricola’s antinomianism. Johann Agricola came to Wittenberg from Eisleben ca. 1537 and asserted that the Law ought not be preached among Christians, but only the Gospel. The comfort of the Gospel should be preached first, and only then might people be frightened by God’s wrath. In this connection Agricola made a highly unusual distinction between wrath and law. He referred to Rom. 2:4, where we are told that “God’s kindness is meant to lead you to repentance.” With this in mind, Agricola maintained that men should be aroused to contrition and repentance only through the Gospel—through the preaching of Christ’s suffering. Luther looked upon Agricola’s thesis as a grave misinterpretation of his doctrine and became involved in the struggle himself (in a number of disputations with the antinomians, as well as in the treatise Wider die Antinomer, 1539). Luther pointed out that the contrition and grief which is associated with repentance can only be awakened by the Law, which reveals sin. Hence the Law must be proclaimed. The Law is everything that reveals sin, wrath, and death. And to the extent that the Christian is always a sinner, he remains subject to the operation of the Law, which is designed to put the old man to death. Agricola’s antinomian views did not exert any great influence at the time, but similar ideas have been put into practice in Lutheran circles since that time—for example, in the group which had its center at Herrnhut.
c. The problem of synergism. The so-called synergistic controversy of the 1550s and 1560s traced its origins from the statements of certain “Philippists” to the effect that the will could be said to cooperate to some extent in the conversion experience. The major opponents were Flacius and Strigel, who gave this matter a thorough analysis at the Weimar Disputation of 1560. According to Strigel the will, in conversion, continues to function in its natural way. It is simply transformed from an evil will to a good will. But Flacius asserted that the natural will is entirely unable to assist in conversion. It does not merely remain passive; it actively resists grace. Because of this, a completely new will, a “new man,” must be created, while the old will is restrained and coerced by the grace of God. This debate—which led to no tangible result—was obscured by the fact that the opposing sides held stubbornly to the question of the cooperation of the will (synergism), while as a matter of fact another problem was also involved. For Strigel proceeded on the basis of a philosophically conceived theory of the will, while Flacius—although with strange expressions—supported the Biblical concept of the new creation (the new man). Strigel’s main point was that conversion, as a progressive experience, always takes place on the level of the human will. Flacius maintained, on the other hand, that the first stage of the conversion experience (or “the first conversion,” as he put it) is wholly the result of grace, and that the human will, which is naturally depraved, is so far removed from doing what is good that it rather resists the grace of God.
Flacius’ controversial teaching of original sin also became involved in this same debate. Strigel, who held that man does not receive a new will (in a substantial sense) in conversion, also asserted that the essence of man was not lost in the fall into sin. He was therefore able to describe original sin as an “accident.” But Flacius felt that this represented a modification of the sin concept, and so he opposed Strigel on this point as well. According to Flacius, original sin is a “substance,” or rather, something congruent with man’s substantial form (forma substantialis). Basically, Flacius desired to defend the Biblical and Lutheran totus homo view of man (by which original sin concerns the whole man, just as regeneration implies the appearance of a “new man”), but he transformed this trend of thought into an (even philosophically) unsatisfactory theory which was generally repudiated by theologians and cast the shadow of heresy over its author.
d. The rejection of Osiander’s doctrine of justification. Andreas Osiander (remembered as a leader of the Reformation in Nürnberg, later pastor in Königsberg) in a debate in 1550 set forth certain ideas concerning justification which were obviously foreign to the current interpretation. Osiander believed that our justification cannot be provided by the atoning work wrought by Christ many hundreds of years ago. It must rather be related to the Christ who dwells within us, i.e., to the divine nature which is imparted to us through the acceptance of the Gospel. What Osiander objected to, in other words, was the undiluted imputation concept. He taught that we become just not through an external imputation but by the fact that Christ dwells in us as an “inner Word.” The Atonement is only the necessary prerequisite for this experience, given once and for all time.
Osiander’s critics (above all, Melanchthon and Flacius) insisted that the concept of “justification,” as used in the Bible, means “to declare just.” Justification by faith is possible because of Christ’s superabundant fulfilling of the Law, imputed to us. This is an aliena justitia, located outside of us (extra nos). One must carefully distinguish between this and the first stages of regeneration, which come into being as a result of the indwelling Spirit and which are not the basis of justification.
The undiluted imputation idea and its related forensic concept of the Atonement made it hard to grasp the connection between justification and regeneration. But as a result of the Osiandrian controversy the original Reformation idea that it is the sinner who is justified and that justification by faith consists of the forgiveness of sin (and not of inherent qualities) was strongly affirmed. In his own way Osiander had intended to express some facets of Luther’s theology which had otherwise been ignored, but he confused Reformation concepts with speculations derived from the Cabala and mysticism (the inner Word). The current Lutheran interpretation of justification was more firmly established as a result of the dispute with Osiander. The tendency to distinguish between imputation and regeneration and to think of the Atonement solely in legalistic categories was strengthened.
e. The Majoristic controversy made no essential contribution to the theological discussion. Georg Major, one of Melanchthon’s followers, defended the proposition that “good works are necessary to salvation.” The Gnesio-Lutherans looked upon this as an example of works righteousness, and they replied (as they had in the Osiandrian controversy) by drawing a sharp line of demarcation between justification (which precedes all works) and regeneration. One of Major’s most zealous opponents, Nikolaus von Amsdorf, advocated the opposite thesis, that “good works are harmful to salvation.” It is obvious that both propositions were poorly formulated and left room for numerous misunderstandings. Major did not mean that good works are necessary for justification; he only meant to say that they must accompany faith—that faith would cease without them. Hence good works are necessary to preserve faith. Against this it was pointed out that justification is not preserved by works but only by faith, which is to say, by returning to grace.
Amsdorf intended to give expression to the Lutheran sola fide concept when he set forth his thesis. The way he did this, however, served to obscure the ineluctable connection between faith and works. The chief results of this controversy were that in the future many of the ambiguous formulations used in the debate were avoided and that conditions were provided for a clearer definition of the place of good works within the context of the doctrine of justification.
f. The second antinomian controversy was chiefly concerned with the question of the third use of the Law. Some of the so-called Gnesio-Lutherans—Amsdorf, Poach, and Otto—maintained that neither justification nor the new life is regulated by the Law, but that both are elevated above the legal order. The justified man does not therefore stand under the Law; he freely fulfills its commands. This is not antinomianism in the strict sense of the term, since these men did not question the preaching of the Law or deny the function of the Law in producing knowledge of sin. They simply desired to sharpen the contrast between the Gospel as a gift of grace and the Law as something to which men are obligated. Those who opposed them said that a denial of the third use of the Law involved a diminution of the Law’s status, and they therefore called it antinomianism. The problem was settled in such a way that the idea of a third use of the Law was commonly accepted. This implies that the concept of the Law is understood in the widest sense as a designation for God’s will in general, and not simply as an expression for an obligatory order. The point was also made that the regenerated are not only “righteous” but also “sinners,” and because of this require the guidance and nurture of the Law.
g. The dispute over adiaphora. In the interest of attaining unity between the different confessions, Melanchthon conceded that the Lutherans could reintroduce a number of discarded ceremonies. These were, as seen from the Lutheran point of view, “adiaphora”—things indifferent to faith and conscience. The Leipzig Interim of 1548, a confessional document accepted for a time by some Lutheran churches, elaborated this point of view. The stricter Lutherans, however, looked upon this as an act of treason against the evangelical faith. These reinstituted ceremonies were certainly adiaphora; but when enemies of the Gospel insisted on their use as a necessary thing, then their acceptance implied a denial of evangelical freedom. In a situation which involved one’s confession or the freedom of the Gospel, nothing could be thought of as an adiaphoron. Flacius said, “When confession and offense are involved, nothing is an adiaphoron” (In casu confessionis et scandali nihil est adiaphoron). The harsh words spoken by Paul to Peter in the situation recorded in Gal. 2 were used as a comparison. Melanchthon later recognized that he had been in error on this question.
h. The controversy over the Lords Supper. The Calvinistic concept of the Lord’s Supper was attacked in 1552 by the Lutheran theologian Joachim Westphal of Hamburg. This led to a thorough debate on the Sacrament between Lutherans and Calvinists. Among the Lutherans who took part was the above-mentioned Johannes Brenz, who upheld the conservative Lutheran position and set forth anew the concepts of ubiquity and of the communication of attributes as arguments in support of a literal and realistic interpretation of the words of institution.
Melanchthon and his disciples, who dominated the faculty in Wittenberg at this time, did not at the outset become involved in this dispute. After Melanchthon died, however, the Lord’s Supper became the most decisive point of controversy between the Philippists and the Gnesio-Lutherans. The Wittenberg theologians felt that the Real Presence ought not be explained with the help of the ubiquity doctrine. They were opposed in this by Martin Chemnitz and by Jakob Andreä of Württemberg. When an anonymous statement written by one of Melanchthon’s followers appeared in 1574 and set forth the Reformed implications of Melanchthon’s doctrine of the Lord’s Supper, the Elector took action against the Wittenberg theologians. The so-called Torgau Articles condemned the Calvinist point of view. The Philippists on the Wittenberg faculty were replaced in the 1570s by conservative Lutheran theologians, and so-called Crypto-Calvinism was suppressed.
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